Epicurus holds that the goal of life is pleasure (DL 10.131), by which he means a condition free from pain, including fear. Attempting to lead us to this quiescent state, Epicurus wants to show that death is neither a source of pain nor fear, imploring us to "get used to believing that death is nothing to us" (DL 10.124). Epicurus concludes that death is nothing to us by arguing that death is not painful (DL 10.124), that that which is not painful when present is not to be feared (DL 10.125), and, furthermore, that our mortality is no cause for anxiety (DL 10.139). Showing that death is nothing to us is one component of Epicurus' Tetrapharmakon, a four-part doctrine wherein Epicurus removes many obstacles to static pleasure. Epicurus gives a sound argument for the conclusion that death is not painful; however, his conclusion that our mortality should not be a cause for anxiety is very difficult to accept. Perhaps the inexorable limit imposed on life by death cannot impose a similar limit on static pleasure, but even Epicurus agrees that there are other kinds of pleasure to be had in a good life.

Static Pleasure and the Tetrapharmakon

According to Epicurus, the greatest pleasure is "that which is perceived when all pain is removed" (Cicero, On Ends I.37). Epicurus calls this static pleasure, differentiating it from the more common conception of pleasure ("kinetic pleasure"), which refers to lively sensations, the satisfying of bodily appetites, etc. The Epicurean school posits static pleasure as the goal of life (DL 10.131), and much of Epicurus' philosophy is directed towards removing the obstacles to static pleasure. Epicurus believes that the "pleasures and pains of the mind are much greater than those of the body," (On Ends I.55) citing the ability of psychological factors such as memory and anticipation to prolong pleasures and pains in the mind; these effects are unparalleled in the body, which only experiences immediate pleasures and pains (On Ends I.55). Both pains of the body (pain) and pains of the mind (fear, anxiety) must be dispelled if we are to achieve static pleasure, so Epicurus gives the Tetrapharmakon, a four-part doctrine that clears the path to static pleasure by quelling fears common among many people. These include fear of the Gods (On the Nature of the Gods I.45), fear of not getting the good (DL 10.130), and fear of evil (DL 10.139). Epicurus believes that these are the greatest causes of anxiety, and he addresses them so that people can rid themselves of fear and achieve static pleasure. The Tetrapharmakon also holds that death is nothing to us.

Death is Not Painful

Epicurus arrives at this conclusion by arguing that death is not painful (DL 10.124), that that which is not painful when present causes unnecessary anxiety when merely anticipated (DL 10.125), and that our mortality is no cause for anxiety (DL 10.125). Pursuant of his conclusion that death is nothing to us, Epicurus first argues that death is not painful. From the Cradle Argument, in which Epicurus shows that pleasure is the goal of life, we are given the premise that what is pleasurable is good, and what is painful is bad (I, On Ends I.30); "as soon as each animal is born, it seeks pleasure and rejoices in it as the highest good, and rejects pain as the greatest bad" (On Ends I.30). Epicurus adds two observations supported by Epicurean ethics and Epicurean physics: that all good and bad consists in sense experience (II, DL 10.124), and that death is the privation of sense experience (III, DL 10.124). It follows that if good and bad are only found in sense experience (II), and there is no sense experience in death (III), then there is nothing good or bad in death (IV). If pleasure is the greatest good and pain is the greatest bad (I), and there is nothing good or bad in death (IV), we conclude that there is neither pleasure nor pain in death; death is not painful (V).

We Should Not Fear Death

Epicurus believes that "we do everything for the sake of being in neither pain nor terror" (DL 10.128); having demonstrated that death is not painful, he argues that we should not fear death, supporting his overarching conclusion that death is nothing to us. Given the previous conclusion that death is not painful (I), Epicurus states that only a fool "fears death not because it will be painful when present but because it is painful when it is still to come" (II, DL 10.125). If something is not painful when we experience it, it is unreasonable for us to be pained by merely anticipating it. From I, we cannot fear death for the belief that it will be painful when present (III), so, to avoid the foolishness in II, we conclude that we should not fear death when it is absent (IV). Epicurus adds the observation that death is absent when we are alive (V, DL 10.125), and it follows that if we should not fear death when it is absent (IV), and that death is absent when we are alive (V), then we should not fear death when we are alive (VI).

Mortality Should Not Cause Anxiety

After removing death as a hindrance to static pleasure by showing that it is neither painful nor to be feared, Epicurus addresses another cause of anxiety for most people: mortality. Epicurus shows that although death precludes immortality, a limited life is no less pleasurable than an unlimited one. Static pleasure, the greatest of all pleasures (I), is that which is experienced when all pain is removed (II, On Ends I.37). Once we are free of all pain, we have static pleasure and "it cannot be increased or augmented;" (III, On Ends I.37) the process through which we gain static pleasure, the removal of pain, cannot be continued after pain has been removed. It follows that the greatest pleasure (I) at its greatest limit (III) is "the limit of the magnitude of pleasure," (DL 10.139) so we find that static pleasure is the limit of the magnitude of pleasure (IV). Epicurus' definition of static pleasure in terms of the absence of pain (II) makes it clear that both a moment of static pleasure and an eternity of static pleasure are intervals of equal and zero pain (V), and it follows from IV and V that the limit of the magnitude of pleasure is the same for both a limited and an unlimited time (VI). In other words, an unlimited time and a limited time contain equal amounts of pleasure (DL 10.139), so a limited life is no less pleasurable than an unlimited one (VII), and the limit imposed on life by death should not be a cause for anxiety (VIII).

A Critical Response

Epicurus gives a sound argument for the conclusion that death is not painful. We readily accept that death, the privation of sense experience, is neither good nor bad, neither pleasurable nor painful, and in this sense death is nothing to us. On the other hand, the same cannot be said of life; life is not nothing to us. Life is not just something to us, either – life is everything to us, and we generally feel that life is good. Epicurus even tells us that living "does not offend" the wise man (DL 10.126), and he who says that it is good not to be born is worse than simple-minded (DL 10.126). That our mortality should not be a cause for anxiety is a very difficult conclusion to accept for this reason. Static pleasure may be limit the of magnitude of pleasure for Epicurus, but he can only say this because he gives a normalized account of pleasure for both limited and unlimited lives by defining it as the experience of feeling no pain (On Ends I.37). It seems reasonable that if we could find one pleasure that is additive or able to be augmented, a longer life would be made more pleasurable than a shorter life by an increase of that pleasure. Friendship comes to mind as such a pleasure: is one friend more pleasurable than none? Are two friends more pleasurable than one? Can friendship increase and become more pleasurable with time? It is clear that the answer to these questions is yes. Perhaps, as Epicurus tells us, the fact that life is limited is no cause for anxiety, but the extent to which it is limited may be.